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Abstract
Motivated by the problem of market power in electricity markets, we introduced in previ-
ous works a mechanism for simplified markets of two agents with linear cost. In standard
procurement auctions, the market power resulting from the quadratic transmission losses
allows the producers to bid above their true values, which are their production cost. The
mechanism proposed in the previous paper optimally reduces the producers’ margin to
the society’s benefit. In this paper, we extend those results to a more general market
made of a finite number of agents with piecewise linear cost functions, which makes the
problem more difficult, but simultaneously more realistic. We show that the method-
ology works for a large class of externalities. We also provide an algorithm to solve
the principal allocation problem. Our contribution provides a benchmark to assess the
sub-optimality of the mechanisms used in practice.
Keywords: Optimal auctions, mechanism design, allocation algorithm, electricity
markets, fixed point.
JEL classification: D44, D62, D82
1. Introduction
Our purpose in this paper is to show how oligopolistic behaviors in network markets
can be tackled using mechanism design. We point out that the optimal mechanism we
obtain has a surprisingly simple expression. We complete this work with algorithmic
tools for the computation of this mechanism. Following a model already discussed in
[1, 2, 3], we consider a geographically extended market where a divisible good is traded.
In this proposal, each market participant is located on a node of a graph, and the nodes
are connected by edges. The good can travel from one node to another through those
edges at the cost of a loss. Since our initial motivation was the electricity market, we will
do the presentation with quadratic loss, but as explained thereafter, our results extend
to a broad class of externalities. We are considering the usual transmission network
constraints with the DC approximation (active power) for the losses.
We will use the word principal to designate what could also be called in the centralized
market literature a central operator, or in the context of electricity markets, an ISO. The
principal, who aggregates the (inelastic) demand side, has to locally match -i.e. at each
node - production and demand at the lowest expense through a procurement auction. As
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argued in [3], this setting can be applied to describe real electricity markets, but it could
also be used in other markets where a good is being transported. Either way, there is a
clear antagonism between the market participants: the operator wants to minimize his
expected cost while the producers want to maximize their expected profits. Therefore, at
the same time that there is a transaction and a commitment between each agent and the
principal, there also exists competition among the agents. In a standard procurement
auction, the market power resulting from the quadratic line losses allows the producers to
bid above their true values, or production cost [1]. The mechanism reduces the producers’
margin and decreases the social cost represented in this case by the optimal value of the
principal. This optimal auction design was introduced by Myerson in 1981 [4] for a
non-divisible good and no externalities.
We build on an electricity market model introduced by the second author in two previ-
ous papers [2] and [1]. The authors wrote a brief presentation of this model in [5]. Other
models were proposed for example in [6], [7], and [8], with a focus on the existence of a
market equilibrium. We pinpoint that if our initial motivation was electricity markets,
network markets are used in other setting such as telecommunication [9]. Distributed
markets were also studied in [10, 11], with a focus on efficiency and linear cost for trans-
missions. For more information on the techniques we use in this paper the reader can
refer to [12], [13], [14], [15], the chapter 45 of [16] and [17] for general introductions on
principal-agent theory, mechanism design, game theory and lattices theory respectively.
In the sequel we consider, as we did in [3], that every participant knows the demand
at each node before the interactions begin and that the production cost of each agent
is private information. In a standard setting, the agents are the first to bid their costs,
after which the principal, knowing the bids, minimizes his cost. In a standard setting, the
principal is, therefore, a bid-taker. The producers know they influence the allocation and
compete with each other to maximize their individual profit. Since the demand is known
by everyone, everyone can guess the principal reaction once the bids have been announced:
we can therefore virtually remove the principal from the interaction in the standard
setting and consider that the agents are players of a game with incomplete information
(since the agents do not know their fellow agents’ preferences). This equivalence is
true provided that the agents are not communicating with each other. The mechanism
changes the payoff function of this game -subject to constraints we detail in this article-
so as to minimize the principal’s expected cost before the bids are announced. Allowing
the principal to act first by revealing a committing rule gives him a strategic advantage
in the negotiation.
We restrict our discussion to deterministic demand, but the reasoning extends natu-
rally to random demand as long as any possible realization of the demand satisfies the
model assumptions. Indeed, since the optimal mechanism constructed in this article is
incentive compatible, then a random version (where the demand is revealed after the
producers’ bidding phase, as in [2]) would be realization-wise incentive compatible, and
so incentive compatible. Observe that the mechanism we propose in the sequel could be
adapted to elastic, piecewise linear demand.
Our first main result is actually the mechanism design characterization. The result
is valid for a very general class of externalities as explained in the generalization section.
This characterization of the optimal mechanism could be used to assess the sub-optimality
of the mechanisms used in practice.
Interestingly, the allocation procedures for the optimal and the standard mechanism
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are the same (one just needs to modify the input of the allocation procedure of the
standard mechanism to get the allocation of the optimal mechanism). Our second main
result is a principal allocation algorithm based on a fixed point. The fixed point could
be interpreted as cooperating agents trying to minimize a global criterion by sharing
relevant information. Our implementation of the algorithm gives good results against
standard methods. We point out that the numerical computation of the Nash equilibrium
for the procurement auction (important to compare the optimal mechanism and the
standard auction setting) requires an efficient algorithm to compute the allocation. Some
other additional facts are presented within the paper: the smoothness of the allocation
functions (q and Q), a decreasing rate estimation for the fixed point iterations, some
results of numerical experiments with the fixed point algorithm.
We describe the market in the next section. In §3 we introduce and solve the mech-
anism design problem. In §5, we study the standard allocation problem and propose an
algorithm to solve it. In §6 we sum up and comment on our main results and propose
possible continuations of this work.
2. Market description
The production cost of each agent is assumed to be piecewise linear, non-decreasing
and convex in the quantity produced. This class of functions is sufficiently rich to rep-
resent real-life problems and is sufficiently simple for theoretical study. In this work we
need to assume that the production levels at which there is a slope change are known in
advance and are exogenous - that is the agents cannot choose them-. Then, without loss
of generality, we assume that there is a quantity q¯ such that the changes of slope only
occur at the multiples of q¯. Thus, the authors find it practical to write the production
cost functions in the form
Cc(q) =
N∑
j=1
cj min((q − (j − 1)q¯)+, q¯), (1)
where N ∈ N and the cj are some slopes coefficients specific to the agent, while q is the
quantity produced. We will sometimes refer to the vector of the cj as the cost vector
(of the agent). If we denote by qji the quantity produced by agent i at marginal cost c
j
i ,
then qji = min((qi− (j− 1)q¯)+, q¯), where qi is the total quantity produced by this agent.
Let c∗ < c∗ ∈ R∗+ and C a set of non-decreasing N -tuples of [c∗, c∗]. To each element c
of C we associate the piecewise linear cost function q → Cc(q). Throughout the paper
we set, for any c ∈ C, cN+1 = c∗ to simplify the notations in some proofs. Note that in
practice a capacity constraint of the type q ≤ jq¯ for a given agent can be implemented
by setting its (j + 1)th slope cj+1 equal to a big positive number. If an agent of cost
vector c produces a quantity q and receives a transfer x, then its profit is
ui = x− Cc(q). (2)
There are n agents numbered from 1 to n in the market. We denote I = [1 . . . n] and
use generically the letter i to refer to a specific agent, and −i to refer to I\{i}. We denote
J = [1 . . . N ] and we will use generically j for the cost coefficients of the jth segment
(starting from 1). The agents are dispatched on the n nodes of a graph. At each node
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i we find the corresponding agent i and a local demand di. The nodes are connected
by undirected edges. We write V (i) the set of nodes different from i connected to i.
Obviously if i1 ∈ V (i2) then i2 ∈ V (i1). We denote E = {(i1, i2) : i1 ∈ V (i2)} the set
of undirected edges. For each (i1, i2) ∈ E, we introduce a quadratic loss coefficient ri1,i2
such that ri1,i2 = ri2,i1 . In the context of electricity markets, this quadratic coefficient
corresponds to the Joule effect within the lines. We make the non restricting assumption
that N is big enough so that in what follows production at each node is smaller than
q¯N .
We assume that both the agents and the principal are risk neutral: they maximize
their expected profit. If the principal proposes to pay a price xi to agent i to make her
produce a quantity qi - this agent being free to accept or decline the offer- and if the
agent i has a production cost defined by ci, then he accepts the offer if
xi − Cci(qi) ≥ 0. (3)
Then for agent i, either xi ≥ Cci(qi) or qi = 0. Thus, if the principal knew the cost
vectors ci, he would solve an allocation problem with those ci, and then bid to the agents
the quantity and the payments corresponding to the solution of the allocation problem.
But the principal does not know the cost vectors, and instead what happens is that
the agents tell him some values for the ci (not necessarily their real cost vectors), and
then the principal decides based on those values. In this case, previous works [1] showed
that the agents could receive non-zero profits and bid above their production costs. The
question we now address is how to reduce their margins.
To do so, we need to consider an intermediate scenario between the one in which the
agent knows nothing (and is a price taker), and the one in which he knows everything
(and therefore directly optimizes the whole system as a global optimizer). Each agent is
characterized by an element fi, which is a probability density of support included in C
and an element ci of C drawn according to fi. Only agent i knows ci, which is private
information. The other agents and the principal only know the probability fi with which
it was drawn. The density fi corresponds to the public knowledge on agent i’s production
costs so the principal won’t accept any bid ci that is not in the support of fi. We assume
that the cost slopes are not correlated for a given agent and between agents, i.e. their
laws f ji are independent. In particular fi(ci) =
∏
j∈J f
j
i (c
j
i ). In such situation, it makes
sense to define
f−i(c−i) =
∏
i′∈I\i
fi′(ci′) and f(c1, .., cn) =
∏
i∈I
fi′(ci), (4)
and E (respectively Ec−i) the mean operator with respect to f (respectively f−i). The
density f (resp. f−i) represents the uncertainty from the principal’s (resp. agent i)
perspective. To simplify notations we will use the symbol Cn to denote the product
of the supports of the fis. We denote by Q the set of allocation functions - which
are the applications from Cn to Rn+, by X the set of payments functions -which are
the applications from Cn to Rn, and by H the set of flow functions - which are the
applications from Cn to RE -. A direct mechanism is a triple (q, x, h) ∈ (Q,X ,H). Let
(q, x) ∈ (Q,X ). For this payment function and this allocation function, the expected
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profit of agent i of type ci and bid c
′
i is
Ui(ci, c
′
i) = E−iui = Xi(c′i)−
∑
j∈J
cjiQ
j
i (c
′
i). (5)
where the capitalized quantities
Qji (ci) = E−i min((qi(ci, c−i)− (j − 1)q¯)+, q¯) and Xi(ci) = E−ixi(ci, c−i) (6)
correspond to the average of their non capitalized counterpart. We also denote by
Vi(ci) = Ui(ci, ci). (7)
the expected profit of agent i if he is of type ci and bids her true production cost.
For i ∈ I, j ∈ J and ci ∈ Ci let Kji (ci) =
∫ cji
cj−i
fi(c
−j
i , s)ds/fi(ci). We point out that
by independence of the laws of the cji , K
j
i (ci) =
∫ cji
cj−i
f ji (s)ds/f
j
i (c
j
i ) = K
j
i (c
j
i ). Thus
Kji is simply the ratio of the cumulative distribution and the probability density for c
j
i .
Our main assumption is the discernability assumption: for all i ∈ I and ci ∈ Ci, the
virtual cost Ji,j(c
j
i ) = c
j
i +K
j
i (c
j
i ) is increasing in j. As demonstrated in the next section,
the virtual cost could be interpreted as the real marginal cost augmented by a marginal
information rent. The assumption imposes the marginal information rent to be such that
for any bid, the virtual marginal prices are increasing, i.e. the virtual production cost
function is convex. The assumption is necessary to show the independence property of
the reformulation in Lemmas 6 and 7.
This assumption implies the non overlapping working zones assumption: if we denote
by Ci the support of fi, then Ci should be of the form:
Ci = [c
1−
i , c
1+
i ]× . . .× [cN−i , cN+i ] (8)
with c1−i < c
1+
i < . . . < c
N−
i < c
N+
i . We could interpret each segment over which the
agent has a constant marginal cost as a working zone with identified productive assets.
The expertise of the market participants should allow them to, based on the working zone,
assess the marginal cost of the agent. This makes senses for instance if the setting is
repeated over time. This estimation need to be precise enough so that there is no chance
that it corresponds to another working zone. We use this assumption in particular in the
proof of lemma 4. For simplicity we assume that cji → cji +Kij(cji ) is increasing in cji . 3.
This assumption can be withdrawn using the ironing technique introduced by Myerson
without difficulty. To finish with the market presentation, we introduce the products of
the type sets Cn =
∏
i∈I C
i′ and C−i =
∏
i′∈I\{i}C
i′ .
3. Mechanism Design
We begin with the revelation principle as expressed in [18].
3This is the piecewise linear adaptation of the classic monotone likelihood ratio property assumption
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Theorem 1 (Revelation Principle). To any Bayesian Nash equilibrium of a game of
incomplete information, there exists a payoff-equivalent direct revelation mechanism that
has an equilibrium where the players truthfully report their types.
According to the revelation principle, we can look for direct truthful mechanisms.
Because, there is no reason why the agents should willingly report their types we need
to add a constraint on the design to enforce truthfulness. This means that the profit of
any agent i of type ci should be maximal when agent i bids her true type ci i.e. for all
(c′i, ci)
Ui(ci, ci) ≥ Ui(ci, c′i). (IC) (9)
This is the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint. In addition, since we want all agents
to participate in the market, we need the participation constraint imposing that for all
ci
Ui(ci, ci) ≥ 0. (PC) (10)
Without this constraint, the principal would optimize as if the agents would accept any
deal (even deals where they would make a negative profit). The last constraint is that
the supply should be at least equal to the demand at every node. The supply available
at a given node is equal to the production augmented by the imports minus the exports
and the line losses. As explained earlier, there is a loss when some quantity hi,i′ of
the divisible good is sent from one node i to another i′. This loss is equal to ri,i′h2i,i′ ,
where ri,i′ is a multiplicative constant. In order to obtain symmetric expressions, we
will proceed as if half of this quantity was lost by the sender, and the other half by the
receiver (see for instance [1]). Note that we could have equivalently used signed flows,
but we would have lost some symmetry in the formulation. Then the supply and demand
constraint writes, for all i ∈ I and c ∈ Cn,
qi(c) +
∑
i′∈V (i)
hi′,i(c)− hi,i′(c)−
h2i,i′(c) + h
2
i′,i(c)
2
ri,i′ ≥ di. (SD) (11)
We point out that for an optimal allocation (see §5) , hi,i′hi′,i = 0.
The principal decision is a triple (q, x, h) ∈ (Q,X ,H). This decision is made under
the constraints (IC), (PC) and (SD). Since we assume that the principal is risk neutral,
his goal is to minimize his average cost, which translates mathematically by his criterion
being equal to the expected sum of payments. Finally the optimal mechanism is the
solution of
Problem 1.
minimize
(q,x,h)∈(Q,X ,H)
∑
i∈I
Exi(c)
subject to
∀c ∈ Cn,∀i ∈ I : qi(c) +
∑
i′∈V (i)
hi′,i(c)− hi,i′(c)−
h2i,i′(c) + h
2
i′,i(c)
2
ri,i′ ≥ di (SD)
∀c ∈ Cn,∀(i, i′) ∈ E : hi,i′(c) ≥ 0
∀i ∈ I, ∀(c′i, ci) ∈ C2i : Ui(ci, ci) ≥ Ui(ci, c′i) (IC)
∀i ∈ I, ∀ci ∈ Ci : Ui(ci, ci) ≥ 0 (PC).
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We now proceed to solve the optimal mechanism design problem, which is a functional
optimization problem with an infinity of constraints, some of which are expressed with
integrals. The essential observation is that this complicated problem is equivalent to a
much simpler one. The proof relies on the comparison with two intermediate problems:
Problem 2.
minimize
(q,x,h)∈(Q,X ,H)
∑
i∈I
Exi(c)
subject to.
∀c ∈ Cn,∀i ∈ I : qi(c) +
∑
i′∈V (i)
hi′,i(c)− hi,i′(c)−
h2i,i′(c) + h
2
i′,i(c)
2
ri,i′ ≥ di(SD)
∀c ∈ Cn,∀(i, i′) ∈ E : hi,i′(c) ≥ 0
∀i ∈ I, ∀j ∈ J, (c−j , t1, t2), (c1, . . . , tk, . . . , cN ) ∈ Ci, : Vi(c1, .., cj−1, t1, cj+1.., cN )
− Vi(c1, .., cj−1, t2, cj+1.., cN ) =
∫ t2
t1
Qji (c
1, .., cj−1, s, cj+1.., cN )ds (H1)
∀i ∈ I, ∀(c, c′) ∈ c2 : (c− c′).(Qi(c)−Qi(c′)) ≤ 0, (H2)
∀i ∈ I, ∀ci ∈ Ci : Vi(ci) ≥ 0 (PC),
and
Problem 3.
minimize
(q,h)∈(Q,H)
E
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
qji (c)(c
j
i +K
j
i (c
j
i ))
subject to
∀(c, i) ∈ Cn × I : qi(c) +
∑
i′∈V (i)
hi′,i(c)− hi,i′(c)−
h2i,i′(c) + h
2
i′,i(c)
2
ri,i′ ≥ di(SD)
∀c ∈ Cn,∀(i, i′) ∈ E : hi,i′(c) ≥ 0.
∀c ∈ Ci,∀i ∈ I : xi(c) =
∑
j∈J
qji (c)c
j
i +
∫ cj+i
cji
qji (c
1
i . . . c
j−1
i , t, c
(j+1)+
1 . . . c
N+
i ; c−i)dt.
The inequality on the scalar product in (H2) is the piecewise linear equivalent of
a monotonicity condition already encountered in [3]. The first two problems are very
similar, but (IC) has been replaced by (H1) and (H2) and (PC) is expressed in terms of
V instead of U . This replacement is a trick introduced by Myerson in his 1981 paper.
We will show later on how we can compare Problems 2 and 3, but note that Problem 3
is simpler, as the optimization part can be solved pointwise (and x can be deduced from
this pointwise optimization). The main result of this paper is that the three problems
have the same solution.
3.1. Necessary conditions for Problem 1
We derive some necessary conditions for a solution of Problem 1. In fact, we only
use constraint (IC) to deduce the two next results. The first lemma indicates that any
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solution of the first problem should be such that Q is monotonous. This is a classic result
already introduced in [4] and [3], for instance. The novelty here is that in the context
of piecewise linear production cost functions, this monotonicity result is expressed in a
vectorial sense.
Lemma 1 (Q monotonicity). If (q, x, h) is admissible for Problem 1, then for all agent
i ∈ I and all (ci, c′i) ∈ C2i
(ci − c′i).(Qi(ci)−Qi(c′i)) ≤ 0 (12)
where . is the scalar product in RN .
Proof. We omit the i in the proof, as it plays no role. First, let (c, c′) ∈ C2i by the (IC)
constraint,
U(c, c) ≥ U(c, c′) and U(c′, c′) ≥ U(c′, c) (13)
i.e.
X(c)−
∑
j∈J
cjQj(c) ≥ X(c′)−
∑
j∈J
cjQj(c′)
X(c′)−
∑
j∈J
cj
′
Qj(c′) ≥ X(c)−
∑
j∈J
cj
′
Qj(c).
(14)
We get the lemma after the summation of the two inequalities and simplification.
Lemma 1 indicates that an agent should be producing less on average in his ith
working zone if he is bidding a higher marginal cost for this working zone.
Lemma 2. If (q, x, h) is admissible for Problem 1 then for any agent (omitting i) for
any c, t1 and t2
V (c1, . . . , cj−1, t1, cj+1, . . . , cN ) =V (c1, . . . , cj−1, t2, cj+1, . . . , cN )
−
∫ t1
t2
Qj(c1, . . . , cj−1, s, cj+1, . . . , cN )ds
(15)
Proof. The inequality U(c, c) ≤ U(c, c′) implies that c′ → U(c, c′) is maximal at c for
any c ∈ Ci. Moreover,
t→ U((c1, .., cj−1, t, cj+1.., cN ), c) = X(c)−
∑
k∈J\{j}
ckQk(c)− tQj(c) (16)
is absolutely continuous, differentiable with respect to t for all c, and its derivative is
−Qj(c). By definition of qj , Qj ≤ q¯. The envelope theorem yield the result.
3.2. Necessary conditions for Problem 2
We derive some necessary conditions for a solution of Problem 2.
Lemma 3. If (q, x, h) is an optimal solution to Problem 2 then (omitting i) for all c ∈ Ci
V (c) =
∑
j∈J
∫ cj+
cj
Qj(c1 . . . cj−1, t, c(j+1)+, . . . , cN+)dt. (17)
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Proof. According to (H1)
∑
j∈J
∫ cj+
cj
Qj(c1 . . . cj−1, t, c(j+1)+, . . . , cN+)dt =
∑
j∈J
V (c1, .., cj−1, cj , c(j+1)+, . . . , cN+)− V (c1, .., cj−1, c(j)+, . . . , cN+)
= V (c)− V (c1+, . . . , cN+).
This is an expression for V (c) as a sum of a positive function of c and a constant
V (c1+, . . . , cN+). It is clear that to optimize the criteria, this constant should be as
small as possible. The participation contraint (PC) imposes that V (c1+, . . . , cN+) ≥ 0,
therefore V (c1+, . . . , cN+) = 0.
A consequence of this is:
Corollary 1. If (q, x, h) is an optimal solution of Problem 2 then for all i ∈ I,
Vi(c
1+
i , . . . , c
N+
i ) = 0. (18)
Proof. See the proof of Lemma 3.
Corollary 1 means that if an agent bids a production cost function that is the max-
imum of what he could bid, he should not make any profit, which is why he should be
paid exactly his production cost. We see with this lemma that if the public information
is inaccurate and the real cost of an agent is higher than what could be expected, then
there is a risk that the participation constraint is not satisfied. On the other hand, it
should not be surprising that an agent can have a zero profit: remember that in the
extreme case in which the principal knows everything (discussed in §2), the agents do
not make any profit.
Another consequence of lemma 3 is
Lemma 4. If (q, x, h) is an optimal solution of Problem 2, the expected profit of agent i
(over his type) is
EVi(c) =
∑
j∈J
∫
(c1..cn)∈Ci
Qji (c
1, . . . , cj , c(j+1)+, . . . cN+)Kji (c)fi(c)dc. (19)
Proof. By Lemma 3 and Fubini’s lemma, EVi(c) is equal to
E
∑
j∈J
∫ cj+
cj
Qji (c
1, . . . , cj−1, t, c(j+1)+, . . . cN+)dt
=
∑
j∈J
∫
c−j∈C−j
∫ cj+
cj=cj−
∫ cj+
t=cj
Qji (c
1, . . . , cj−1, t, c(j+1)+i , . . . c
N+
i )fi(c)dtdc
jdc−j .
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Our task is now to compute the inner term. Applying again Fubini’s lemma, this term
is equal to ∫ cj+
cj=cj−
∫ cj+
t=cj
Qji (c
1, . . . , cj−1, t, c(j+1)+, . . . cN+)fi(c)dtdcj =∫ cj+
t=cj−
∫ t
cj=cj−
Qji (c
1, . . . , cj−1, t, c(j+1)+, . . . cN+)fi(c)dcjdt =∫ cj+
t=cj−
Qji (c
1, . . . , cj−1, t, c(j+1)+, . . . cN+)(
∫ t
cj=cj−
fi(c)dc
j)dt =∫ cj+
t=cj−
Qji (c
1, . . . , cj−1, t, c(j+1)+, . . . cN+)(
∫ t
cj=cj−
fi(c)
fi(c−j , t)
dcj)fi(c
−j , t)dt =∫ cj+
t=cj−
Qji (c
1, . . . , cj−1, t, c(j+1)+, . . . cN+)Kji (t)fi(c
−j , t)dt =∫ cj+
cj=cj−
Qji (c
1, . . . , cj−1, cj , c(j+1)+, . . . cN+)Kji (c
j)fi(ci)dc
j
We get the lemma by summing all the inner terms.
Lemma 5. If (H1) is satisfied, then for any (a, b) ∈ C2i (omitting i)
X(a)−X(b) =
∑
j∈J
[ajQj(a)− bjQj(b) +
∫ bj
aj
Qj(b1 . . . bj−1, t, aj+1 . . . aN )dt] (20)
Proof. Because of its length the proof is detailed in Appendix Appendix A
Lemma 6. If (q, x, h) verifies (H1) and (H2) and Qji is independent of c
j′
i for j
′ > j,
then for all (c, c˜) ∈ C2
U(c, c) ≥ U(c, c˜). (21)
Proof. Since (H1) is satisfied, equation (20) of Lemma 5 applies. We combine this relation
with the definition of the expected profit U from (5). We obtain:
U(c, c)− U(c, c˜) =
∑
j∈J
cjQj(c)− c˜jQj(c˜)+
∫ c˜j
cj
Qj(c˜1, ..., c˜j−1, t, cj+1, ...cN )dt+ cjQj(c˜)− cjQj(c)
=
∑
j∈J
(cj − c˜j)Qj(c˜1, ..., c˜j−1, c˜j)) +
∫ c˜j
cj
Qj(c˜1, ..., c˜j−1, t)dt
=
∑
j∈J
∫ c˜j
cj
Qj(c˜1, ..., c˜j−1, t)−Qj(c˜1, ..., c˜j−1, c˜j)dt,
where we used the independence hypothesis for the second equality. By (H2), which
implies the decreasingness of Qj with respect to cji when all other quantities are fixed,
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if cj < c˜j then for any t ∈ [cj , c˜j ], Qj(t) − Qj(c˜j) ≥ 0. Otherwise, we use the formula∫ b
a
= − ∫ a
b
and the fact that any t ∈ [c˜j , cj ] verifies Qj(t) − Qj(c˜j) ≤ 0. Therefore
U(c, c)− U(c, c˜) is non negative.
3.3. Necessary conditions for Problem 3
We derive some properties for Problem 3.
Lemma 7. There is an optimal solution (q, x, h) for Problem 3 such that qji (and Q
j
i )
is independent of cki for k 6= j.
Proof. First note that x is not taking any role in the optimization problem: it is defined
afterward. The only real optimization variables are then q and h. Remember that qji is
defined as a function of q by qji = min((qi−(j−1)q¯)+, q¯). The constraints are defined for
each c ∈ Cn and the integral criterion is in fact a sum of independent criteria depending
on q(c) for c ∈ Cn. Therefore we can solve Problem 3 with a pointwise optimization.
By the discernability assumption, for any c ∈ Cn and i ∈ I, cji + Kji (cji ) is increasing
in j. Therefore for all c ∈ Cn, i ∈ I, ∑j∈J qji (c)(cji + Kji (cji )) is a convex criteria in qi
and therefore the pointwise problem corresponds to Problem 4 of §5. In particular, we
can apply Lemma 10 from the next section. Thus qji only depends on c
j
i and c−i. This
property is preserved by integration over the c−i: Q
j
i only depends on c
j
i .
We point out that, since the pointwise problem has a unique solution, the pointwise
optimal solution introduced in the proof is uniquely defined.
Theorem 2. If (q, x, h) is the pointwise optimal solution of Problem 3 and Kji is smooth
in cji for (i, j) ∈ I × J and c ∈ Ci, then for all i ∈ I, Qi is C∞ over Ci.
Proof. Remember that cji → cji + Kji (cji ) is increasing, so by composition with smooth
bijection, we can do the proof as if the costs involved were cji instead of c
j
i + K
j
i (c
j
i ).
According to Lemma 11, qi is continuous. Since qi is bounded, we can apply the domi-
nated convergence theorem to show that Qi is continuous. We can then we proceed by
mathematical induction. Assume that Qi is C
l, then take c0i ∈ Ci and cki a sequence
in Ci that converges to c
0
i . Since Sˆ = ∪k∈NS(cki ) is a countable union of null measured
set (by Lemma 22), its measure is zero. Without changing the results, we can compute
the integrals on C−i\Sˆ instead of C−i. Since qi and its derivatives are bounded, we
can apply the dominated convergence theorem to compute the limit of
Q
(l)
i (c
0
i )−Q(l)i (cki )
c0i−cki
as k goes to +∞ as the integral of a limit. Since we removed the point over which this
limit was not defined, we get that
Q
(l)
i (c
0
i )−Q(l)i (cki )
c0i−cki
has a limit, and this limit does not
depend on the sequence cki . So Qi is l + 1 times derivable at ci, for all ci. We conclude
by induction.
3.4. Resolution of the mechanism design problem
Last but not least, we state the main result of the Section.
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Theorem 3. Let (qji , h) be defined such that for any c ∈ Cn, (qji (cji , c−i), h(c)) solves
minimize
qji ,h
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
qji (c
j
i , c−i)(c
j
i +K
j
i (c
j
i ))
subject to
0 ≤ qji ≤ q¯∑
j∈J
qii(c
j
i , c−i) +
∑
i′∈V (i)
hi′,i(c)− hi,i′(c)−
h2i,i′(c) + h
2
i′,i(c)
2
ri,i′ ≥ di
hi,i′(c) ≥ 0,
and set
qi(c) =
∑
j∈J
qji (c
j
i , c−i) and xi(c) =
∑
j∈J
qji (c
j
i , c−i)c
j
i +
∫ cj+i
cji
qji (t, c−i)dt, (22)
then (q, h, x) solves the optimal mechanism design problem (Problem 1).
Proof. • First note that (q, h, x) is the pointwise solution of Problem 3 so it is optimal
for Problem 3, moreover, by construction (q, h, x) satisfies (SD) and h ≥ 0.
• Then note that by Lemma 4, (q, h, x) solves a relaxation of Problem 2, but is it
admissible for Problem 2 ?
• By definition of V (omitting i),
V (c1 . . . aj . . . cN )− V (c1 . . . bj . . . cN ) =
Ex(c1 . . . aj . . . cN )− x(c1 . . . aj . . . cN )− [Qj(aj)aj −Qj(bj)bj ] =
Eqji (a
j , c−i)aj +
∫ cj+i
aj
qji (t, c−i)dt− Eqji (bj , c−i)bj −
∫ cj+i
bj
qji (t, c−i)dt
−[Qj(aj)aj −Qj(bj)bj ] = E
∫ bj
aj
qji (t, c−i)dt =
∫ bj
aj
Qji (t)dt
where we used the definition of x, the definition of Q and Fubini lemma’s for the
second, third and fourth equalities. Threfore (q, h, x) satisfies (H1).
• By construction, qji is non-increasing in cji+Kji (cji ) then using the third assumption,
qji is non-increasing in c
j
i so for any (a, b, c−i) ∈ C2 ×C−i, (aji − bji )(qji (aji , c−i)−
qji (b
j
i , c−i)) ≤ 0, so by integration with respect to c−i, (aji −bji )(Qji (aji )−Qji (bji ) ≤ 0
and then by summation over j, (c− c′).(Qi(c)−Qi(c′)) ≤ 0, i.e. (H2) is satisfied.
• Since (H1) is satisfied, Vi(ci) ≥ Vi(c+i ). Moreover, Vi(c+i ) = 0 by construction of x.
Therefore the participation constraint (PC) is satisfied.
• Therefore (q, h, x) is admissible for Problem 2. So it solves Problem 2.
• Since (q, h, x) solves Problem 2, by Lemma 6 the incentive compatibility constraint
(IC) is satisfied. Moreover, by Lemma 3, (PC) is satisfied. Thus (q, h, x) is admis-
sible for Problem 1, but is it optimal ?
12
• By Lemmas 1 and 2, any optimal solution of Problem 1 should be admissible for
Problem 2. Since the criteria are the same, we conclude that (q, h, x) is an optimal
solution of Problem 1.
3.5. Comments
In the optimal mechanism, the agents are paid at a marginal price which is equal to
their bid augmented by an information rent. This information rent depends on the prob-
lem structure since it is built from a collection of allocation problems, and it depends on
the available information by the fact that, in these optimization problems, the marginal
prices are replaced by the virtual marginal prices cji + K
j
i (c
j
i ). We point out that, as
already noted in [19], the computation of such rent may pose a practical difficulty for
large problems.
Notice that, by construction, the optimal mechanism is incentive compatible no mat-
ter the value of K since (H1) is verified anyway as long as the hypotheses are satisfied.
If this market is repeated over time, the principal can learn the distribution of the pro-
ducers’ cost parameters.
The model extends to the case in which some nodes do not have a producer and where
for others, the demand is null. In particular, we can consider the buyer/suppliers setting
where there is demand only at one node.
One may argue that one limit of the current result is that it does not take into
account any network constraints. Nonetheless, the structure of the proof makes it clear
that we exploited only some properties of the allocation problem. Therefore, the optimal
mechanism construction is valid for any market for which the allocation problem satisfies
these properties. We detail this argument in the next section.
In addition, the optimal mechanism construction is valid for limiting case in which
r = 0 at some edges. In this case, one needs to specify the definition of q since the
solution of the allocation problem may not be a singleton.
4. Extension to General Network Constraints
We now explain why the optimal mechanism proposal can be extended to a large
variety of network constraints. This extension is of particular importance for power mar-
ket networks, since the admissibility of an allocation is subject to its physical feasibility.
While this difficulty can be avoided as long as the network is radial, the general case is
known to bring its lot of technical challenges. As argued in [20] , the allocation problem
can be written:
min
∑
i Ji (qi)
s.t. gi(h) + qi = di, i = 1, 2, . . . , n
Ah+Bq = b
h ∈ H, q ∈ Q
(23)
With gi being concave functions, A and B are p×m and p×n real matrices; b ∈ Rp,
and H and Q are (convex) products of segments in Rm and Rn respectively.
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They observe that whenever the multipliers of the first set of constraints in (23) are
positive (*), then the optimal solution of (23) is also a solution of
min
∑
i Ji (qi) s.t. (h, q) ∈ C (24)
where
C = {(h, q) ∈ X s.t. gi(h) + qi ≥ di, i = 1, 2, . . . , n} (25)
and
X = {(h, q) s.t. Ah+Bq = bh ∈ H, q ∈ Q}. (26)
We assume that (*) is satisfied. Otherwise said, we require the sub-gradient of the value
of (24) to be positive. We could equivalently require the uniqueness of the solution of
(24).
We can then focus on the study of (24). We denote by δC the support function of C
and set U = {u = (u1, . . . , un) |ui ≤ 0} Applying Theorem 10.1 from [21], we get that a
necessary and sufficient condition for an allocation to be optimal is that:
0 ∈ ∂
∑
i
Ji(qi) + δC(h, q), (27)
Now observe that
∂δC(h, q) = NC(h, q) = (28){
z −
∑
i
yi∇(gi(h) + qi)(h, qi)|y ∈ NU ([gi(h) + qi]i), z ∈ NX(h, q)
}
(29)
The last equation requires the qualification constraint (Q) from [22] to be satisfied, so
one can use Theorem 4.3 from [22]. Still, note that no matter Q being satisfied, NC does
not depends on c.
Theorem 4. If (*) is satisfied, then qji is independent of c
k
i for k 6= j, moreover, the
mechanism proposed ib the previous section can be applied to (23).
Proof. Fix c and consider the associated optimal allocation q. Observe that either qji ∈
]0, q¯ji [ or q
j
i ∈ {0, q¯ji }.
First case. If qji ∈]0, q¯ji [, take k 6= j then cki does not appear in the first order condition
(27). By Berge’s Maximum Principle [23], the optimal allocation is upper hemicontinuous
with respect to the parameter cki , by unicity of the solution of (24), we get that qi is
continuous with respect to cki . Thus there is a neighbourhood of c
k
i such that q
j
i is still
in ]0, q¯ji [. In this neighbourhood, condition (27) is satisfied for q
j
i = q
j
i , by unicity of the
solution, qji is constant with respect to c
k
i on this neighbourhood.
Second case. qji ∈ {0, q¯ji }. Without loss of generality, let us assume that qji = q¯ji . Here,
we need to observe that the sub-differential of the criteria with respect to qi is [c
j
i , c
j+1
i ],
thus the reasoning of the first case can be reproduce whenever k 6= j + 1. So we only
need to deal with the situation where k = j + 1. Moreover, since qi is non-increasing in
cj+1i , only an increase of c
j+1
i can potentially trigger a change in q
j
i . Observe that by
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Berge’s Maximum Principle, qji is continuous with respect to the parameter of interest
cj+1i . If it happens to take a value different than q¯
j
i , then this value is also a solution to
(27) for the initial parameters, which is in contradiction with the unicity of the solution
of (27).
4.1. Discussion on the non-overlaping zone assumption
We show here how the non-overlaping zone structure naturally emerges if we envision
slightly different context and adapt the notations accordingly:
(1) we focus on a specific producer, and refer to him implicitly in this paragraph, (2)
we assume the competition is known, (3) we only suppose the types distribution to have
a density f over C 4, denoting by fj the marginals, (4) it will prove to be convenient to
use q ∗ c := Cc(q) and denote by j(q) the integer part of q/q¯.
Let q and x be some optimal allocation and payment rules for the producer. We
assume q and x are continuous and have derivatives almost everywhere. The producer’s
profit is x(s)− q(s) ∗ c whenever his type is c and he signals himself as of type s. When
the competition is known, we pinpoint that for any value q = q(c) of the allocation
function, there should be a unique payment that we denote by xq. If it was not the
case, then the producer would be better off revealing what is required to get the highest
possible payment at q, which violates the incentive compatibility constraints (IC).
We observe that, by (IC), x(q) − q ∗ c is maximal at qc, which implies in particular
that cj(q) ∈ ∂qx(qc). Hence, almost everywhere and whenever q is not a multiple of q¯,
cj(q) is uniquely defined. Setting cq = cj(q), we observe that xq =
∫ q
0
ctdt(?).
If we take s ∈ C such that q(s) is not a multiple of q¯, then by (IC) we know that c→
x(c)− q(c)∗s should be maximal at s. Take t such that tj(q(c)) = sj(q(c)) and q(t) 6= q(s),
then we should have j(q(t)) 6= j(q(s)) which would imply a discontinuity of q somewhere.
Hence: whenever sj(q(s)) = tj(q(s)), q(s) = q(t) (??). Let Ck = {c ∈ C, j(q(c)) = k},
c−k = inf{ck, c ∈ Ck}, and c+k = sup{ck, c ∈ Ck}. By combining (??) with the monotony
of q, we get that the intersection of the [c−j , c
+
j ] has an empty interior.
4.2. Examples with log-concave functions
We point out that a sufficient condition to check the monotone likelihood ratio prop-
erty is that F/f is increasing. If F is a smooth cumulative distribution function with f
being the corresponding smooth and positive density, then F/f is increasing iff f/F is
decreasing iff lnF ′ is decreasing iff lnF is concave. A function f is said to be log-concave
if ln f is concave. Many density functions encountered in economic and engineering liter-
ature are log-concave: the uniform, the normal, the exponential and the power function
and the Laplace distribution all have log-concave density functions. We refer to [24]
for the results we use on this class of functions. The class of log-concave is stable by
monotonic transformation and truncation. Moreover, it happens that if a probability
density distribution is log-concave, then the corresponding cumulative distribution is
log-concave. In mechanism design theory, it is standard to assume F is log-concave [25].
We want to see the implication of the discernability assumption. This assumption
imposes a gap ∆ equals to Kji (c
j+
i ) between c
j+
i and c
(j+1)−
i . We compute this gap for
4we still keep non decreasing marginal costs, otherwise we would loose the continuity of q
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some standard cases. To simplify the notations and the computation, we assume without
loss of generality that cj− = 0 and write cj+ = c+. This results in the following table:
Table 1: The gap ∆ for some standard probabilities
Name ∝ f(x) ∝ F (x) K(x) ∆
Uniform 1 x x c+
Power Function λ( xc+ )
λ−1 c+( xc+ )
λ x
λ
c+
λ
Weibull λ( xc+ )
λ−1e(−
x
c+
)λ c+(1− e−( xc+ )λ) c+λ ( c
+
x )
λ−1(e(
x
c+
)λ − 1) c+ e−1λ
Laplace 12e
−λ|x− c+2 | x > c
+
2 ,
2−e−λ c
+
2 e−λ(x−
c+
2
)
2λ
2
λ (e
c+
2 λ − 1)
Exponential (reversed) λe−(c
+−x)λ e−c
+λ(exλ − 1) 1−e−xλλ 1−e
−c+λ
λ
We truncate the probabilities so that they have support in [0, c+]. The symbole ∝
means that we express f and F modulo the multiplication by a common constant (due
to the truncation) and λ is a positive parameter that should be greater than 1 for the
Power function and the Weibull probability. For the uniform distribution, we see that
the intervals should be of non-decreasing sizes. For instance, one could take c1 ∈ [c¯, 2c¯],
c2 ∈ [3c¯, 4c¯], c3 ∈ [5c¯, 6c¯], etc. For the Power, the Weibull and the exponential functions,
we see that the gap could be made smaller.
5. Study of the allocation problem
5.1. The standard auction problem
The previous section motivates the study of the allocation problem for different rea-
sons. Firstly, as we have already pointed out in the proofs, the results of §3 rely on
some properties of the solution of the standard allocation problem. In addition to those
properties, we derive in this section an algorithm to compute the solution of the standard
allocation problem. According to 3, these algorithms can be used for both the original
auction problem and the optimal mechanism design. To benchmark the mechanism de-
sign equilibrium against an equilibrium of the Bayesian game related to the standard
auction, numerical efficiency is pivotal: indeed, the Bayesian equilibrium estimation re-
quires a large number of allocations computations.
Let us first introduce the standard allocation problem. In a standard mechanism,
the principal solves an allocation problem based on the bids he receives. Those bids
will be denoted by cji , where as before i ∈ I corresponds to the ith agent and j ∈ J
corresponds to the jth working zone with constant marginal price. To model the fact
that the production costs are piecewise linear, we use some positive variables qji so that
qji ≤ q¯, for any i ∈ I, the quantity produced by agent i is qi =
∑
j∈J q
j
i and the related
production cost is
∑
j∈J c
j
i q
j
i . As before, an allocation should satisfy the constraint that
production exceeds demand. We end up with Problem 4:
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Problem 4.
minimize
(q,h)
∑
i∈I
∑
j∈J
qji c
j
i
subject to ∀i ∈ I :
∑
j∈J
qji +
∑
i′∈V (i)
hi′,i − hi,i′ −
h2i,i′ + h
2
i′,i
2
ri,i′ ≥ di (λi)
∀(i, i′) ∈ E : hi,i′ ≥ 0 (γi,i′)
∀(i, j) ∈ I × J : qji ≥ 0 (µi,j)
∀(i, j) ∈ I × J : qji ≤ q¯ (νi,j).
(30)
The notations for the dual the variables associated with each constraint are indicated
in parentheses. Those variables are in R+.
For any node i ∈ I, we define the function Fi for λ ∈ [mini c1i ,maxi cNi ]n
Fi(λi, λ−i) = di +
∑
i′∈V (i)
λi′ − λi
ri,i′(λi + λi′)
+
(λi′ − λi)2
2ri,i′(λi + λi′)2
. (31)
Later on we justify that this function could be interpreted as the production of agent i
when the multipliers are λi and λ−i. Its partial derivative with respect to λi is
∂λiFi(λi, λ−i) = −
∑
i′∈V (i)
4
ri,i′
λ2i′
(λi + λi′)3
< 0. (32)
The derivative is negative: when i increases its price it is assigned smaller production
quantities. The partial derivative of Fi for i
′ ∈ I\{i} is
∂λi′Fi(λi, λ−i) =
{
4
ri,i′
λi′λi
(λi+λi′ )3
> 0 if i′ ∈ V (i)
0 else.
(33)
When another agent becomes less competitive, i is assigned more production. Let k ∈
J ∪ {0}. The limit at +∞ and 0 of Fi(x, λ−i)− kq¯ are
lim
x→+∞Fi(x, λ−i)− kq¯ = di − kq¯ −
∑
j∈V (i)
1
2ri,j
(34)
and
lim
x→+∞Fi(x, λ−i)− kq¯ = di − kq¯ +
∑
j∈V (i)
3
2ri,j
. (35)
Without loss of generality (otherwise we could impose capacity constraints), we assume,
the first term to be strictly negative and the second to be strictly positive, hence by the
intermediate value theorem, Fi − kq¯ has a zero. Since Fi − kq¯ is decreasing in λi, this
solution is unique. Now we define for i ∈ I and k ∈ J ∪ {0}, gki as the function that
associates any λ−i ∈ [mini c1i ,maxi cNi ]n−1 with the unique x such that and Fi(x, λ−i) =
kq¯ and x > 0:
Fi(g
k
i (λ−i), λ−i) = kq¯
gki (λ−i) > 0.
(36)
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Lemma 8. For any i ∈ I, k ∈ J ∪ {0}, λ−i ∈ [mini c1i ,maxi cNi ]n−1 and i′ ∈ V (i)
∂λi′ g
k
i (λ−i) > 0. (37)
In particular, gki is increasing in λi′ for i
′ ∈ V (i).
Proof. According to the implicit function theorem
∂gki (λ−i)
∂λi′
= − ∂Fi
∂λi′
/
∂Fi
∂λi
, (38)
It is clear that gki (λ−i) is decreasing in k. We proceed with the computation of the
dual of Problem 4. If a strong duality theorem applies, then we should have
min
q,h
max
λ,γ,ν,µ
∑
i∈I,j∈J
qji c
j
i +
∑
i∈I
λi{di − (
∑
j∈J
qji +
∑
i′∈V (i)
hi′,i − hi,i′ −
h2i,i′ + h
2
i′,i
2
ri,i′)}
−
∑
i∈I,j∈J
γi,jhi,j +
∑
i∈I,j∈J
νi,j(q
j
i − q¯)− µi,jqji
= max
λ,γ,νµ
min
q,h
∑
i∈I
λidi −
∑
i∈I,j∈J
νi,j q¯ + q
j
i (c
j
i + νi,j − λi − µi,j)
+
∑
(i,i′)∈E
hi,i′{λi − λi′ − γi,j}+ h2i,i′ri,i′
λi + λi′
2
,
so that for any (i, i′) ∈ E, by necessary and sufficient first order condition
hi,i′ =
γi,i′ + λi′ − λi
ri,i′(λi′ + λi)
. (39)
By replacing h by its expression in the dual variables we get something equivalent to
maximize
(λ,γ,µ,ν)
∑
i∈I
{λidi −
∑
j∈J
νi,kq¯ −
∑
i′∈V (i)
(λi − λi′ − γi,j)2
2ri,i′(λi + λi′)
}
subject to ∀(i, j) ∈ I × J cji + νi,j ≥ λi + µi,j .
(40)
The expression of γ with respect to λ follows. For any (i, i′) ∈ E
γi,i′ =
{
0 if λi ≤ λi′
λi − λi′ else
(41)
thus the dual problem is equivalent to
maximize
(λ,µ,ν)
∑
i∈I
{λidi −
∑
j∈J
νi,j q¯ −
∑
i′∈V (i)
(λi − λi′)2
4ri,i′(λi + λi′)
}
subject to ∀(i, j) ∈ I × J cji + νi,j ≥ λi + µi,j ,
(42)
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because µ does not play any role in the admissibility of the other variables nor in the
objective, this is equivalent to
maximize
(λ,ν)
∑
i∈I
{λidi −
∑
j∈J
νi,j q¯ −
∑
i′∈V (i)
(λi − λi′)2
4ri,i′(λi + λi′)
}
subject to ∀(i, j) ∈ I × J cji + νi,j ≥ λi,
(43)
The expression of ν follows. For any (i, j) ∈ I × J
νi,j =
{
0 if λi ≤ cji
λi − cji else.
(44)
We can now justify that we have strong duality: the operator is continuous, convex-
concave and the dual variables are restricted to be in a bounded set.
The dual of the allocation problem is therefore written:
maximize
λ≥0
∑
i∈I
{λidi − q¯
∑
j∈J
(λi − cji )δλi≥cji −
∑
i′∈V (i)
(λi − λi′)2
4ri,i′(λi + λi′)
}, (45)
where
δx≥y =
{
1 if x ≥ y
0 else.
(46)
For i ∈ I we maximize the criteria
λidi − q¯
∑
j∈J
(λi − cji )δλi≥cji −
∑
i′∈V (i)
(λi − λi′)2
4ri,i′(λi + λi′)
, (47)
which is strictly concave for any λ−i (sum of concave and strictly concave functions).
We denote by Λi(λ−i) its maximizer. The first order necessary and sufficient condition
on Λi is:
0 ∈ Fi(Λi, λ−i)−Ki(Λi), (48)
where
Ki(λi) =

0 if λi < c
1
i
[j − 1, j]q¯ if λi = cji
jq¯ if λi ∈]cji , cj+1i [, j 6= N
Nq¯ if λi ∈ λi ∈]cNi , c¯[,
(49)
We conclude
Lemma 9. For any i ∈ I and any λ−i ∈ [mini c1i ,maxi cNi ]n−1, Λi(λ−i) is the unique
solution of
Fi(Λi, λ−i) ∈ Ki(Λi). (50)
We point out that the primal (and dual) solution unicity is a desirable property that is
not systematic for the allocation problems of centralized market models. The expression
of h with respect to λ (39) together with the fact the fact the supply constraint should
be binding at optimality justify the interpretation of Fi proposed at the beginning of this
subsection. In the following sequel we use this property many times.
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5.2. Some properties of the solution
If r and d are set, we can see the solution of Problem 4 as a function of the vector
c ∈ Cn. We denote by q(c) the solution of Problem 4 with the cost vector c. Similarly,
we define qi(c), q
j
i (c), λ(c) and λi(c). We give here two properties of the allocation
problem solution. By integration, we showed in the previous section that the solution of
the mechanism design inherits those properties.
Lemma 10. Let (q(c), h(c)) be a solution of Problem 4, then qji (c) does not depend on
cli for l 6= j:
qji (c
1, . . . cj−1, cj , cj+1 . . . , cN ; c−i) = qji (s
1, . . . sj−1, cj , sj+1 . . . , sN ; c−i) (51)
Proof. Let i ∈ I, j ∈ J , c−i ∈ Cn−1, c = (c1, . . . , cN ) ∈ C and s = (s1, . . . , sN ) ∈ C
such that sj = cj . We shall prove that qji (s, c
−i) = qji (c, c
−i). We denote by λc (resp.
λs) the dual variables associated with the nodal contraints for the allocation problem
parametrized with c (resp. s). First if
qji (c, c
−i) ∈]0, q¯[, (52)
then by lemma 9 λci = c
j
i and using Lemma 9 again, λ
s
i = c
j
i . Therefore λ
s = λc, from
which we deduce that qji (c, c
−i) = qji (s, c
−i).
Therefore without loss of generality, we can assume that
qji (c, c
−i) = q¯ and qji (s, c
−i) = 0. (53)
Then using Lemma 9 we get
λci ≥ ck and λsi ≤ ck, (54)
so that λci ≥ λsi . If λci > λsi , then λc−i ≥ λs−i by non-decreasingness of Λi′ , i′ ∈ I\{i}
(explained in §5.3) Therefore all the other agents are producing less, which is absurd
since i is already producing less.
We extend the notations by setting for all i ∈ I, c0i = c∗. We consider the subset S
of C for which at some nodes i, the multiplicator λi is equal to the marginal cost and
the production is a multiple of q¯ (i.e. stuck in an angle):
S = {c ∈ Cn, qi(c) = jq¯ and λi(c) = cj
′
i for some i ∈ I, j ∈ J ∪{0}, j′ ∈ {j, j+1}}. (55)
The set S corresponds to the points of transition between the two possibilities defined
by the first order condition (48). Because of the angle, it is natural to think that this is
where irregularities may happen (see the proof of the next lemma). We introduce this
set to show some regularity properties of q and Q. We detail the proof in the Appendix.
The approach consists in showing that S is a finit union of sets of zero measure. This is
also true for the projection of S on the {ci} × C−i. Then we observe that on C\S, the
relations between the primal and dual variables are smooth.
Lemma 11. The function q is C∞ on Cn\S and C0 on Cn.
Proof. We postpone the proof to Appendix Appendix B
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5.3. Fixed point
In this subsection we show that the solution of the dual problem is the unique fixed
point of a monotone operator. We define
Λ(λ1, ..., λn) = (Λ1(λ−1), ...,Λn(λ−n)). (56)
Lemma 12. For any i ∈ I, Λi is non-decreasing.
Proof. Let λ−i < λ′−i and the corresponding Λi and Λ
′
i. Assume Λi > Λ
′
i. Since Fi is
decreasing in the first variable and increasing in the second
Fi(Λi, λ−i) < Fi(Λ′i, λ
′
−i) (57)
Moreover for any x ∈ K(Λ′i) and y ∈ K(Λi), x ≤ y and Fi(Λi, λ−i) ∈ K(Λi), Fi(Λ′i, λ′−i) ∈
K(Λ′i). Therefore Fi(Λ
′
i, λ
′
−i) ≤ Fi(Λi, λ−i) which is absurd.
We will use the following classical result (see [17] for a proof and definition of complete
lattice).
Theorem 5 (Knaster-Tarski fixed point). Let L be a complete lattice and let f an
application from L to L and order preserving. Then the set of fixed points of f in L is a
complete lattice.
In particular, the set of fixed points is non empty. Since Λ is order preserving and
[c∗, c∗]n is a lattice when we consider the natural order, there is a fixed point, and the
set of fixed points is a lattice.
Lemma 13. λ is optimal for the dual ⇔ λ is a fixed point of Λ.
Proof. • If λ is optimal for the dual, then each component i maximizes the criteria
(47), thus λ is a fixed point of Λ.
• If λ is a fixed point of Λ, then by definition, each component i maximizes the
criteria (47). Hence since the problem is (strictly) concave, λ is optimal.
A consequence of the previous lemma is that
Lemma 14. The set of fixed points of Λ is a singleton.
Definition 1 (Continuous for monotone sequence). We consider the natural partial
order on Rn. We say that a function G is continuous for monotone (resp. increasing,
decreasing) sequences if for any monotone (resp. increasing, decreasing) sequence xn
converging to a point x in the domain of G, G(xn) goes to G(x) as n goes to infinity.
Clearly, a function is continuous for monotone sequences if and only if it is continuous
for increasing and decreasing sequences.
Lemma 15. The operator Λ is continuous for monotone sequences.
The intuition of the proof is that we can use the monotony of the sequence and
Lemma 9 to characterize the behaviour of Λ on the neighborhood. We find that Λ is
either constant or characterized by the implicit function theorem.
21
Proof. Let λ¯−i, j ∈ [1 . . . N ], we first deal with the ’nice’ case, that corresponds to
Fi(Λ(λ¯−i), λ¯−i) ∈]j − 1, j[q¯
• If Λi(λ¯−i) ∈]cji , cj+1i [ (we do not treat the case j = N , which is very similar to
what follows) then since Fi is C
∞ and of invertible derivative (non zero) in λi, the
implicit function theorem tells us that the solution ψ of Fi(ψ(λ¯−i), λ¯−i) = jq¯ is
continous in a neighborhood B of λ¯−i. Thus we can make B small enough so that
for λ−i ∈ B, ψ(λ−i) ∈]cji , cj+1i [. On this neighborhood, ψ satisfies the first order
conditions and so by unicity of the solution of the optimization problem, since those
conditions are sufficient, ψ = Λi on B. Therefore Λi is continous at λ¯−i.
• If Λi(λ¯−i) = cji (as before, we do not treat the case j = N), then by Lemma 9
Fi(Λi(λ¯−i), λ¯−i) = [j− 1, j]q¯, if Fi ∈]j− 1, j[q¯ (we deal with the border case in the
next point) then since Fi is continuous, there is a neighborhood B of λ¯−i such that
Fi(Λi(λ¯−i), λ−i) ∈]j − 1, j[q¯, so on B Λi is constant and therefore continuous.
• We proceed with the borders. If Fi(Λi(λ¯−i), λ¯−i) = (j − 1)q¯ and Λi(λ¯−i) = cji .
– Decreasing case: Let us take  ∈ Rn−1+ such that Fi(Λi(λ¯−i), λ¯−i + ) ∈ [j −
1, j]q¯ (Fi is continuous and increasing in λ−i). Then Λi(λ¯−i + ) = Λi(λ¯−i)
checks the first order condition so Λ is constant, and we get the continuity for
decreasing sequences.
– Increasing case: Fi(Λi(λ¯−i), λ¯−i) = (j − 1)q¯ hence there exists a ball B
such that the implicit function theorem applies and there exists ψ such that
Fi(ψ(λ¯−i− ), λ¯−i− ) = (j− 1)q¯ and ψ(λ¯−i) = Λi(λ¯−i) = cji (remember that
Λi(λ¯−i) = c
j
i by hypothesis) . Since Fi is increasing in the second variable
and decreasing in the first, ψ is increasing. For  of positive components and
sufficiently small, ψ(λ¯−i − ) ∈]cj−1i , cji [ (since ψ(λ¯−i) = Λi(λ¯−i) = cji ) and
check the first order condition. Therefore for  of positive components and
sufficiently small, ψ = Λi by uniqueness of the solution. Thus Λi is continuous
for increasing sequence.
• We do the same analysis if Fi(Λi(λ¯−i), λ¯−i) = jq¯ and Λi(λ¯−i) = cji .
The conclusion follows.
We could have alternatively used the Berge Maximum theorem for strictly concave
criterion to get the continuity of Λ. Yet, we chose to present this proof for pedagogical
reasons because it contains some key ideas (see appendix).
Theorem 6. The sequence (Λk(cN1 ...c
N
n ))k∈N converges to the solution of the dual.
Proof. Since Λ(cN1 ...c
N
n ) ≤ (cN1 ...cNn ), and since Λ is order preserving, the sequence
Λk(cN1 ...c
N
n ) = λ
k is non increasing and bounded, therefore it converge to a point x.
Since Λ is continuous for monotone sequence, x is a fixed point.
Theorem 7. For any i ∈ I, λ−i ∈ [c∗, c∗]n−1, Λi(λ−i) has the following explicite ex-
pression:
Λi(λ−i) = min{cNi ,min
j∈J
{cji1Fi(cji ,λ−i)<jq¯}, mink∈[0..N−1]{g
k
i (λ−i)1gki (λ−i)∈[cki ,ck+1i ]}} (58)
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Proof. We denote by Gi the RHS of (58) and show that for any i
Fi(Gi(λ−i), λ−i) ∈ K(G(λ−i)), (59)
and then we conclude with a uniqueness argument.
If there is j ∈ J such that Gi(λ−i) = cji , then either Fi(cji , λ−i) < jq¯ or gji (λ−i) = cji .
This last possibility implies by definition of gji that Fi(c
j
i , λ−i) = jq¯. Thus Fi(c
j
i , λ−i) ≤
jq¯. Remember that K(G(λ−i)) = [j − 1, j]q¯. So we need to prove that Fi(cji , λ−i) ≥
(j − 1)q¯. Suppose the contrary, i.e. Fi(cji , λ−i) < (j − 1)q¯. Then since Gi(λ−i) = cji ,
F (cji , λ−i) < (j − 1)q¯, which in turn implies that
gji (λ−i) < c
j
i . (60)
Now observe that since Gi(λ−i) = c
j
i , F (c
j−1
i , λ−i) > (j − 1)q¯, which implies that
gji (λ−i) > c
j−1
i . (61)
Combining (60) and (61) with the definition of G, we see that G(λ−i) ≤ gji (λ−i). But
G(λ−i) = c
j
i and g
j
i (λ−i) < c
j
i , which is absurd. Therefore Fi(c
j
i , λ−i) ≥ (j − 1)q¯.
Otherwise, let us assume that there is not such j. Then there is k ∈ [0 . . . N −1] such
that Gi(λ−i) = gki (λ−i). By definition of g
k
i , Fi(Gi(λ−i), λ−i)) = kq¯ and by definition of
G, Gi(λ−i) ∈ [cki , ck+1i ]. So again Fi(Gi(λ−i), λ−i)) ∈ K(Gi(λ−i)). We can now conclude
that Λ = G.
We can interpret the fixed point algorithm as if some benevolent agents situated
at each node of the network were exchanging information. They collectively try to
minimize the total cost and, to do so, they communicate their current marginal costs.
This marginal cost is the minimum of their local marginal cost and the marginal cost of
importation from the adjacent nodes. At each iteration, the agents compute how much
they are going to produce based on their current marginal cost. They then update their
marginal cost based on the information they just received and transmit this marginal
cost to the adjacent nodes. We point out that the information used by each agent is
local.
5.4. Decreasing Rate
We derive in this section an estimate for the decreasing rate. We denote α =
max(e,e′)∈E2 re/re′ . We have the following bound:
Lemma 16. For any (i, i′, k, λ−i) ∈ E × [0, N ]× [c∗, c∗]n−1,
∂λig
k
i′(λ−i) ≥
1
Nα
(
c∗
c∗
)5. (62)
Proof. We combine (38) with (32) and (33).
Lemma 17. Since (λki )k∈N is non-increasing for all i ∈ I, there is a finite number of k
for which at least one coordinate λki satisfies
λki > c
q
i and λ
k+1
i ≤ cqi (63)
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Fixed Point CVX
cost 83.2 83.195
time (s) 2.03 30.23
Fixed Point CVX
cost 4971.4 4971.4
time (s) 28.39 35.23
Table 2: Results for a linear (a) and piecewise linear (b) instances of the problem solved with the fixed
point algorithm and CVX.
or
λki = c
q
i and λ
k+1
i < c
q
i . (64)
We denote by K this set. Let (k1, k2) ∈ N2 such that [k1 − 1, k2 + 1] ∩ K = ∅. Then for
k ∈ [k1, k2] and i ∈ I such that λk−1i 6= λki
λki − λk+1i ≥
1
Nα
(
c∗
c∗
)5 max
i′∈V (i)
(λk−1i′ − λki′) (65)
Proof. By definition of λk, λki −λk+1i = Λi(λk−1−i )−Λi(λk−i). By construction, there exists
j ∈ [0, N −1] such that Λi(λk−1−i ) = gji (λk−1−i ) and Λi(λk−i) = gji (λk−i). Then by monotony
of g, gji (λ
k
−i)− gji (λk−1−i ) is lower bounded by
|∂λi′ gji |∞(λk−1i′ − λki′), (66)
for i′ ∈ V (i). We then take the i′ ∈ V (i) that maximizes (λk−1i′ −λki′) and use the previous
lemma to get the result.
5.5. Algorithm Implementation
We implemented this algorithm in Matlab. We used a dichotomy to compute the gki .
Note that for linear cost the analysis is similar. We define gi(λ−i) as the unique x such
that fi(x, λ−i) = 0 and x ≥ 0 and define Λ such that
Λi(λ) = min(ci, gi(λ−i)) (67)
We performed some numerical comparisons with CVX, a package for specifying and
solving convex programs [26, 27] for both linear and piecewise linear production cost
functions. We generated a graph with 100 nodes connected randomly. To generate the
graph, we used a Barabasi-Albert model [28] to ensure some scaling properties. The
experiment was performed on a personal laptop (OSX, 4 Go,1.3 GHz Intel Core i5). The
networks randomly generated to test the implementations are displayed in Figures 1a
and 1b, and the results are summarized in Table 2.
Both CVX and the fixed point algorithm converges to an estimate of the optimal
value. We did not try to optimize the numerical algorithm, but some trick could be
used to avoid the costly estimation of the gs. Still, the linear version of the fixed point
algorithm was about ten times faster than the CVX resolution. Note that the algorithm
could be distributed, since at each iteration, the computation at each node only depends
on the values of the previous iteration.
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(a) The network generated to test the linear
implementation of the algorithm
(b) The network generated to test the
generic implementation of the algorithm
6. Conclusion
In this paper we have shown how to characterize and compute the optimal mechanism
for a network market. We observed in particular that the allocation problem for the
optimal and the standard mechanism are the same. We have proposed an algorithm
based on a fixed point to solve the allocation problem and derived regularity properties of
the solution. Our contribution provides a direction to benchmark mechanism proposals.
References
[1] J. F. Escobar, A. Jofre´, Monopolistic competition in electricity networks with resistance losses,
Economic theory 44 (1) (2010) 101–121.
[2] J. F. Escobar, A. Jofre´, Equilibrium analysis of electricity auctions, Department of Economics
Stanford University.
[3] N. Figueroa, A. Jofre´, B. Heymann, Cost-minimizing regulations for a wholesale electricity market.
[4] R. B. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Mathematics of operations research 6 (1) (1981) 58–73.
[5] B. Heymann, A. Jofre´, Mechanism design and auctions for electricity network (2016).
[6] D. Aussel, R. Correa, M. Marechal, Electricity spot market with transmission losses, Management
9 (2) (2013) 275–290.
[7] E. J. Anderson, P. Holmberg, A. B. Philpott, Mixed strategies in discriminatory divisible-good
auctions, The RAND Journal of Economics 44 (1) (2013) 1–32.
[8] X. Hu, D. Ralph, Using epecs to model bilevel games in restructured electricity markets with
locational prices, Operations research 55 (5) (2007) 809–827.
[9] E. Altman, T. Boulogne, R. El-Azouzi, T. Jime´nez, L. Wynter, A survey on networking games in
telecommunications, Computers and Operations Research 33 (2) (2006) 286–311. doi:10.1016/j.
cor.2004.06.005.
[10] M. Babaioff, E. Pavlov, N. Nisan, Mechanisms for a Spatially Distributed Market, Games and
Economic Behavior (GEB) 66.
[11] I.-K. Cho, Competitive Equilibrium in a Radial Network, The RAND Journal of Economics 34 (3)
(2003) 438. doi:10.2307/1593740.
[12] J.-J. Laffont, D. Martimort, The theory of incentives: the principal-agent model, Princeton univer-
sity press, 2009.
[13] V. Krishna, Auction theory, Academic press, 2009.
[14] T. Roughgarden, Twenty lectures on algorithmic game theory, Cambridge University Press, 2016.
[15] N. Nisan, Introduction to mechanism design (for computer scientists), Algorithmic game theory 209
(2007) 242.
[16] R. J. Aumann, S. Hart, Handbook of game theory with economic applications, Vol. 2, Elsevier,
1992.
25
[17] D. M. Topkis, Supermodularity and complementarity, Princeton university press, 1998.
[18] R. Gibbons, Game theory for applied economists, Princeton University Press, 1992.
[19] J. R. Correa, N. Figueroa, On the planner’s loss due to lack of information in bayesian mechanism
design, in: Algorithmic Game Theory, Springer, 2009, pp. 72–84.
[20] R. Palma-Benhke, A. Philpott, A. Jofre´, M. Corte´s-Carmona, Modelling network constrained eco-
nomic dispatch problems, Optimization and Engineering 14 (3) (2013) 417–430. doi:10.1007/
s11081-012-9203-5.
[21] R. T. Rockafellar, R. J.-b. Wets, Variational analysis.
[22] R. T. Rockafellar, Lagrange Multipliers and Optimality, SIAM Review 35 (2) (1993) 183–238.
doi:10.1137/1035044.
[23] C. Berge, Topological Spaces: including a treatment of multi-valued functions, vector spaces, and
convexity, 1997.
[24] M. Bagnoli, T. Bergstrom, Log-concave probability and its applications, Economic theory 26 (2)
(2005) 445–469.
[25] J.-J. Laffont, J. Tirole, The dynamics of incentive contracts, Econometrica: Journal of the Econo-
metric Society (1988) 1153–1175.
[26] M. Grant, S. Boyd, Graph implementations for nonsmooth convex programs, in: V. Blondel,
S. Boyd, H. Kimura (Eds.), Recent Advances in Learning and Control, Lecture Notes in Control
and Information Sciences, Springer-Verlag Limited, 2008, pp. 95–110.
[27] M. Grant, S. Boyd, CVX: Matlab software for disciplined convex programming, version 2.1 (Mar.
2014).
[28] A.-L. Baraba´si, R. Albert, Emergence of scaling in random networks, science 286 (5439) (1999)
509–512.
[29] R. K. Sundaram, A first course in optimization theory, Cambridge university press, 1996.
Appendix A. Proof of Lemma 5
Proof. By definition
X(a1 . . . ak−1, b, ak+1 . . . aN )−X(a1 . . . ak−1, c, ak+1 . . . aN ) =
V (a1 . . . b . . . aN )− V (a1 . . . c . . . aN ) +∑
j 6=k
aj [Qj(a1 . . . b . . . aN )−Qj(a1 . . . c . . . aN )]
+bQk(a1 . . . b . . . aN )− cQk(a1 . . . c . . . aN )
=
∫ c
b
Qk(a1 . . . s . . . aN )ds+
∑
j 6=k
aj [Qj(a1 . . . b . . . aN )−Qj(a1 . . . c . . . aN )]
+bQk(a1 . . . b . . . aN )− cQk(a1 . . . c . . . aN ).
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We use (H1) for the last equality. Then we apply a telescopic formula
X(a)−X(b) = X(a1 . . . aN )−X(b1, a2 . . . aN ) +
X(b1, a2 . . . aN )−X(b1, b2 . . . aN ) + . . .
+X(b1 . . . bN
1
, aN )−X(b1 . . . bN )
=
N∑
k=1
(
∫ bk
ak
Qk(b1 . . . s . . . aN )ds) +
N∑
k=1
∑
j<k
bj [Qj(b1 . . . bk−1, ak, ak+1 . . . aN )−Qj(b1 . . . bk−1, bk, ak+1 . . . aN )]
+
N∑
k=1
∑
j>k
aj [Qj(b1 . . . bk−1, ak, ak+1 . . . aN )−Qj(b1 . . . bk−1, bk, ak+1 . . . aN )]
+
N∑
k=1
akQk(b1 . . . bk−1, ak, ak+1 . . . aN )− bkQk(b1 . . . bk−1 . . . bk, ak+1 . . . aN )
Reordering the last three terms, we get
N∑
j=1
∑
k>j
bj [Qj(b1 . . . bk−1, ak, ak+1 . . . aN )−Qj(b1 . . . bk−1, bk, ak+1 . . . aN )]
+
N∑
j=1
∑
k<j
aj [Qj(b1 . . . bk−1, ak, ak+1 . . . aN )−Qj(b1 . . . bk−1, bk, ak+1 . . . aN )]
+
N∑
j=1
ajQj(b1 . . . bj − 1, aj , aj+1 . . . aN )− bjQj(b1 . . . bj−1 . . . bj , aj+1 . . . aN )
=
N∑
j=1
{bj
∑
k>j
[Qj(b1 . . . bk−1, ak, ak+1 . . . aN )−Qj(b1 . . . bk−1, bk, ak+1 . . . aN )]
+ajQj(b1 . . . bj−1, aj , aj+1 . . . aN )− bjQj(b1 . . . bj−1 . . . bj , aj+1 . . . aN ) +
aj
∑
k<j
[Qj(b1 . . . bk−1, ak, ak+1 . . . aN )−Qj(b1 . . . bk−1, bk, ak+1 . . . aN )]}
=
N∑
j
ajQj(a1 . . . aN )− bjQj(b1 . . . bN )
We end up with
X(a)−X(b) =
N∑
j=1
(ajQj(a)− bjQj(b) +
∫ bj
aj
Qj(b1 . . . bj−1, t, aj+1 . . . aN )dt) (A.1)
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Appendix B. On S and the regularity of q
Remember that the set S corresponds to the points of transition between the two
possibilities defined by the first order condition (48):
S = {c ∈ Cn, qi(c) = jq¯ and λi(c) = cj′ for some i ∈ I, j ∈ J, j′ ∈ {j, j + 1}}. (B.1)
Our first goal is to show that S is a finite union of sets of zero measure (Lemmas 18
and 20). To do so, we apply the implicit functions theorem. From this we deduce the
regularity of q (proof of Lemma 11). For any IA, IB partition of I, and IC ⊂ IB not empty,
j ∈ JI and j′ ∈ JI such that for all i, j′ ∈ {ji, ji + 1}, we denote by S(IA, IB , IC , j, j′)
the setc ∈ Cn such that for any i ∈ I

i ∈ IA ⇒ λi(c) = cj
′
i
i and qi(c) /∈ Nq¯
i ∈ IB ⇒ qi(c) = jiq¯
i ∈ IC ⇒ λi(c) = cj
′
i
i
 . (B.2)
For an element c of such set, we denote by M the matrix
M(c) =
(
∂Fi(λ(c))
∂λj
)
(i,j)∈IB
. (B.3)
We need to study the invertibility of M to apply the implicit functions theorem (Lemma
19). Note that the function S is defined on a finite set. We use the image of S to show
that the measure of S with respect to the Lebesgue measure is zero. We first show in the
next lemma that S is included in the finite union of the S(IA, IB , IC , j, j′) family. Then
we will show that each element of this family has a measure equal to zero.
Lemma 18. S ⊆ ∪S(IA, IB , IC , j, j′)
Proof. Take c ∈ S, then by definition of S, there exist i ∈ I, j ∈ J and j′ ∈ {j, j + 1}
such that qi(c) = jq¯ and λi(c) = cj′ , therefore IC is not empty. By Lemma 9, for all
i ∈ I, i is in IA or IB . Hence we have a set S(IA, IB , IC , j, j′) such that c is in this set,
so S is included in the union of those sets.
Lemma 19. For any c ∈ Cn the matrix M(c) is invertible.
Proof. Assume that there are some coefficients αi such that
∑
i αiMi = 0 where Mi is
the ith column of M . Then by (32) and (33), the ith row of this relation writes:
αi
∑
j∈V (i)
λ2j
ri,j(λi + λj)3
=
∑
j∈V (i),j∈IB
αjλiλj
ri,j(λi + λj)3
. (B.4)
We denote bi,j =
λ2jλi
ri,j(λi+λj)3
and ai =
αi
λi
. Then (B.4) is equivalent to
ai =
∑
j∈V (i),j∈IB
aj
bi,j∑
k∈V (i) bi,k
(B.5)
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Insofar as we can slightly perturb the demand, we assume without loss of generality
that t it is not possible to produce a multiple of q¯ at each node and satisfy exactly the
nodal constraints (?).
Considering the biggest ai, we get that all ai are equal by convexity, thus either all
are equal to zero or ∑
j∈V (i)
bi,j =
∑
j∈V (i),j∈IB
bi,j (B.6)
which is not the case since IA is not empty by (?).
Next we show that S(IA, IB , IC , j, j
′) has a zero Lebesgue measure.
Lemma 20. For any IA, IB partition of I, and IC ⊂ IB not empty, j ∈ JI and j′ ∈ JI
such that for all i, j′ ∈ {j, j + 1}, the measure of the set S(IA, IB , IC , j, j′) is zero.
Proof. We assume in the market description that it is not possible to produce a multiple
q¯ at each node and satisfy exactly the nodal constraints ((?). Therefore it is not possible
that IB = I, therefore IA is not empty. By definition of SIA,IB ,IC ,j,j′ , for all i ∈ IB ,
Fi(c
j′
IA
, λIB (c)) = qi(c) = jiq¯, (B.7)
which is a system of equations in λIB parametrized by c
j′
IA
. Let c ∈ C such that the
system is satisfied, by Lemma 19, we can apply the implicit function theorem, hence
there is a ball around c in which S(IA, IB , IC , j, j
′) is included in a smooth surface. By
compacity of C, we can choose a sequence dense in S(IA, IB , IC , j, j
′). We apply the
result to each element of this sequence. By density, S(IA, IB , IC , j, j
′) is a countable
union of smooth surfaces. Therefore the measure of S(IA, IB , IC , j, j
′) is zero.
A direct consequence of Lemma 20 and Lemma 18 is
Lemma 21. The measure of S is zero.
We proceed with the proof of Lemma 11.
of lemma 11. Let c = (c1 . . . cn) ∈ Cn\S. Let us show that q is infinitely differentiable
at c. We consider the two assertions:
Ai = ”∃ki, Fi(λ(c)) ∈]ki − 1, ki[q¯ and λi = cki ”
Bi = ”∃ki, Fi(λ(c)) = kiq¯ and λi ∈]cki , ck+1i [”
By Lemma 9 and by defintion of S, for any i ∈ I either Ai or Bi is true, but never both.
We denote by IA (resp. IB ) the set of elements of I for which Ai (resp. IB) is true. If
Ai is true for all i then there is a neighborhood V of c such that for any element c˜ of V ,
Fi(c˜) ∈]ki − 1, ki[q¯, therefore on V , λ(c˜) = c˜.
Else IB is not empty and by definition of Bi
∀i ∈ IB Fi(λIA , λIB ) = q¯ji, (B.8)
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which we can see as an equation in λIB parametrized by λIA . This equation is satisfied
at λ(c). If we denote by M the matrix
M =
(
∂Fi(λ(c))
∂λj
)
(i,j)∈IB
, (B.9)
thenM is invertible (see lemma 19), the implicit function theorem applies and there exists
a function λIB so that in a neighborhood V of c, for all i ∈ IB , we have Fi(λIA , λIB (λIA)) =
q¯ki. Moreover, since Fi is C
∞ on [c∗, c∗]n, λIB is C
∞ on V . Then if c˜ ∈ V , (c˜, λIB (c˜))
checks the first order condition thus by uniqueness cIA , λIB (c˜) is the dual solution, and
so, qi = Fi(λIB (c˜), c˜) for all i ∈ I on V , so qi is C∞ at c. This concludes the proof of the
first part of the lemma.
The continuity of q comes from Berge maximum principle (see Theorem 9.17 in [29])
in a convex setting.
The next lemma is an important component for the proof of Theorem 2.
Lemma 22. Let i ∈ I and ci ∈ Ci, then the Lebesgue measure of the set
Si(ci) = {c−i ∈ C−i, (ci, c−i) ∈ S} (B.10)
is zero.
Proof. Using Lemma 18, Si(ci) ⊆ {c−i ∈ C−i, (ci, c−i) ∈ ∪S(IA, IB , IC , j, j′)}. Now
let c−i ∈ Si(ci), IA, IB a partition of I, and IC ⊆ IB not empty, and j, j′ such that
(ci, c−i) ∈ S(IA, IB , IC , j, j′). There are three possible cases:
• i ∈ IA then as explained in the proof of Lemma 20, S(IA, IB , IC , j, j′) is locally a
surface parametrized by ci so by projection over an hyperplane of the type ci = x
it also a surface in C−i.
• i ∈ IB\IC locally, q is independant of ci therefore if S(IA, IB , IC , j, j′)∩ (ci,Si(ci))
is of strictly positive measure, then S(IA, IB , IC , j, j
′) has also a strictly positive
measure in Cn, since this is not true, S(IA, IB , IC , j, j
′) ∩ (ci,Si(ci)) is of zero
measure in the neighborhood.
• Else i ∈ IC , which is the tricky part. First by definition of IC , for any element
c of S(IA, IB , IC , j, j
′), qi(c) = jiq¯ and λi(c) = c
j′i
i . Without loss of generality,
we assume j′i = ji, the other case can be treated similarly. Then we make the
observation that we do not modify the c−i of S(IA, IB , IC , j, j′) if we set c
j+1
i = c
j
i .
Since we are interested in S(IA, IB , IC , j, j
′) ∩ (ci,Si(ci)), we can assume without
loss of generality that cj+1i = c
j
i . Then we have reduced to the case i ∈ IA.
We conclude as in the proof of Lemma 20.
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